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SUPPLEMENTAL HEALTH INSURANCE AND EQUALITY OF 
ACCESS IN BELGIUM 
 
Summary 
The effects of supplemental health insurance on health care consumption crucially 
depend on specific institutional features of the health care system. We analyse the 
situation in Belgium, a country with a very broad coverage in compulsory social health 
insurance and where supplemental insurance mainly refers to extra-billing in hospitals. 
Within this institutional background, we find only weak evidence of adverse selection in 
the coverage of supplemental health insurance. We find much stronger effects of socio-
economic background. We estimate a bivariate probit model and cannot reject the 
assumption of exogeneity of insurance availability for the explanation of health care 
use. A count model for hospital care shows that supplemental insurance has no 
significant effect on the number of spells, but a negative effect on the number of nights 
per spell. We comment on the implications of our findings for equality of access to 
health care in Belgium. 
 
Keywords: supplemental insurance, adverse selection, moral hazard, hospital spells, 
equality of access, health care use. 
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Introduction 
In recent decades, many European countries have experienced a growing pressure on 
the financial resources of their public health care systems and a parallel increase in the 
importance of different forms of voluntary health insurance (Mossialos and Thomson, 
2002; OECD, 2004). There are worries that this development threatens the ideal of 
equality of access in these countries, as voluntary health insurance seems mainly 
concentrated among the better-off groups in society.
1
 
 
As emphasized by Jones et al. (2006), a good diagnosis of the situation requires that one 
is able to distinguish carefully between the different factors influencing the link between 
supplemental insurance and health care consumption. If there is adverse selection, i.e. if 
those with higher health care risks are more likely to take out supplemental insurance, it 
becomes crucial to disentangle this selection effect from the insurance effect.
2
 While 
previous empirical work gives much evidence for the existence of a moral hazard (or 
utilization) effect, the results with respect to adverse selection are mixed. The strongest 
                                                 
1 A specific example of this is the concern about the pro-rich inequity in the probability of seeing a 
specialist found in many European countries (van Doorslaer et al., 2004) and the question of whether this 
phenomenon can be explained by the unequal distribution of supplemental insurance coverage (Van 
Doorslaer et al., 2002; Buchmueller et al., 2004; Rodriguez and Stoyonova, 2004; Van Doorslaer et al., 
2004; Jones et al., 2006). 
2
 In addition to the traditional “moral hazard” effect, Jones et al. (2006) mention a series of other 
“insurance” effects: risk reduction, income transfer and access. Empirically, it is impossible to distinguish 
between all these and we will use the terms “moral hazard” and “insurance” effect interchangeably. Some 
papers that have discussed the identification of the selection effect versus the insurance effect are Holly et 
al. (1998), Vera-Hernandez (1999), Schellhorn (2001), Buchmueller et al. (2004), Gardiol et al. (2005). 
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effects seem to be found for the free choice of deductibles in Switzerland (Schellhorn, 
2001; Gardiol et al., 2005). This is not very surprising, given the institutional setting in 
Switzerland with a strong tradition of private health insurance. 
 
The latter point suggests an important insight, i.e. that “the nature of demand for private 
health insurance itself depends on the institutional context in which that insurance 
operates” (Harmon and Nolan, 2001, p. 135). It is indeed obvious that both the degree 
of adverse selection in the voluntary insurance system and the (voluntary) insurance 
effect on health care consumption will crucially depend on the degree of population, 
service and cost coverage in the public (compulsory) system and thus on the type of 
voluntary insurance. The wide variety of possible arrangements has been described in 
the international comparison reports (Mossialos and Thomson, 2002; OECD, 2004), but 
until now there have not been many structured attempts to formulate and test specific 
hypotheses which are linked to these institutional differences. In fact, a careful analysis 
of the institutional setting may in some cases lead to empirical predictions of an 
insurance effect that does not in the first place induce increased consumption. A careful 
consideration of specific institutional features is therefore essential for understanding 
the link between supplemental insurance and equality of access. 
 
In this paper, we analyse the take-up and the consumption effects of voluntary health 
insurance in Belgium. We will describe the Belgian institutional context in the next 
section and we will argue that it leads to specific predictions on the effects of 
supplemental insurance. In the following section, we describe the data that we use to 
test these specific predictions. Next, we present our results for the demand of 
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supplemental insurance and the effects of supplemental insurance coverage on health 
care use. We first estimate a bivariate probit model and we discuss the issue of 
endogeneity of supplemental insurance. We then present separate models for inpatient 
care and outpatient care.
3
 Our data for inpatient care distinguish explicitly between the 
number of spells and the number of nights per spell. This allows us to improve on the 
single spell hypothesis, which has been common in previous research (see, e.g., the 
discussion in Santos Silva and Winmeijer, 2001). We discuss the predictive power of 
our model in an appendix to the paper. We return to the problem of equality of access in 
the final concluding section. 
 
Supplemental health insurance in Belgium 
Belgium has a system of compulsory health insurance, covering the entire population, 
which is organized through private, non-profit sickness funds.
4
 The service and cost 
coverage within the compulsory system and the social contribution rates levied are 
identical for all funds. Compulsory health insurance is combined with independent 
medical practice. Payment is mainly fee-for-service and patients have a large degree of 
freedom in their choice of provider. There are no gatekeeper arrangements. Hospital 
care is provided either by private non-profit or by public hospitals. The system of 
hospital financing distinguishes between medical and non-medical services. The former 
are fully integrated into the system of health insurance and are covered by the sickness 
                                                 
3
 To save space, we only show the results for the main models in the paper. All the other results are 
available from the authors on request. 
4
 More detailed information on the Belgian health care system and on recent reforms can be found in 
Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2005). 
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funds. Here also, remuneration is mainly fee-for-service. Perhaps due to the dominance 
of fee-for-service (in addition to the relatively large number of providers per capita), 
there are hardly any waiting lists. 
 
At the same time, the Belgian system is characterized by large out-of-pocket payments, 
covering overall about 20% of total health expenditures. These out-of-pocket payments 
consist of official co-payments, health care items not included in the compulsory cover, 
and extra-billing. There are only few supplemental insurance policies available, which 
cover the official co-payments. However, the Belgian government introduced social 
protection mechanisms for the poor and the sick, the most important being a “maximum 
billing” ceiling, linked to income. 
 
Compared to most other countries, the coverage of the compulsory insurance package is 
very broad, including e.g. many dentistry items and care in nursing homes for the 
elderly. The most important items not included in the compulsory cover are 
orthodontics, some new or less necessary pharmaceuticals, some physiotherapy and 
non-traditional therapies such as acupuncture and homeopathy. Patients can buy 
supplemental insurance for these treatments, but its importance remains rather limited. 
 
Supplemental insurance is mainly relevant with respect to extra-billing (“supplements” 
in the Belgian terminology). Extra-billing plays an important role in hospital financing. 
On top of co-payments, patients can be charged a part of the price of the materials used. 
Mainly those opting for a single room can also be charged room and fee supplements. 
Physicians who do not subscribe to the officially negotiated fees are allowed to raise 
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supplements irrespective of room choice for all patients with the exception of some 
vulnerable socioeconomic groups. While average co-payments per hospital stay in a 
single room in 2003 were between €150 and €200, supplements were on average above 
€800.5 Supplemental (“hospital”) insurance covers these costs – and in addition usually 
the co-payments and supplements in the ambulatory sector, if they are linked to the stay 
in the hospital. This “hospital insurance” is by far the most important type of 
supplemental health insurance in Belgium and the only one analysed in this article. 
 
Both sickness funds and private insurers provide supplemental insurance. In the private 
sector, both group contracts and individual contracts are offered. The private market 
share in supplemental health insurance has remained rather limited and private insurers 
focus on the higher-income market segment. According to Berghman and Meerbergen 
(2005), supplemental insurance by the sickness funds and by private insurers covered in 
2001 – the year of our data – about 2.35% and 0.65% of total health care expenditures, 
respectively. However, since 2001, the importance of supplemental insurance has 
certainly grown. 
 
It should be clear that this institutional background will influence both the coverage of 
the supplemental health insurance and its impact on health care use. As mentioned 
before, there are hardly any waiting lists and patients with and without supplemental 
insurance are treated in the same hospitals. Supplements in hospitals are strictly 
regulated for patients in two-person and in common rooms and it can reasonably be 
expected that most patients in single rooms have supplemental insurance. While a stay 
                                                 
5
 More information about supplements in Belgium can be found in De Graeve et al. (2006). 
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in a single room will undoubtedly be more comfortable, there is no empirical evidence 
that it will also imply a larger consumption of health care or a better quality of care – in 
any case, if there is an effect, it must be rather due to differences in provider behaviour 
than to reactions by patients on price differences. Moreover, given the broad coverage 
of the compulsory system, we would only expect minor effects of supplemental 
insurance in the ambulatory sector – mainly for the few items, which are not covered, 
and perhaps for ambulatory treatment related to a hospital stay. We will analyse whether 
these predictions are confirmed by the data. 
 
Data 
Our data come from the Health Interview Survey (HIS)
6
 in 2001, a Belgian health 
survey that was set up by the Scientific Institute of Public Health. The HIS collects 
information on supplemental hospital insurance for all adults in the sample through an 
oral interview. The design of the interview allowed for the specific Belgian institutional 
context, thus increasing the adequacy of the answers. This is a significant improvement 
over existing surveys. We decided to focus our analysis of the take-up at the individual 
(and not at the household) level, because health status is supposed to be a crucial 
variable and can be defined adequately only at the individual level.
7
 We therefore 
omitted from the sample the respondents that were still going to school, because the 
supplementary insurance question did not apply to them. We lost additional 
                                                 
6
 More information on the HIS can be found in Demarest et al. (2002). 
7
 For the analysis of the determinants of health care consumption, we constructed a variable at the 
individual level indicating whether the individual or a family member has supplemental health insurance 
for hospitalization. All common supplemental insurance policies in Belgium include coverage of 
household members. 
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observations due to item non-response in the independent variables. However, the share 
of individuals with supplemental hospital insurance (62.40%) in our estimation sample 
(n = 5349) hardly deviates from that in the total sample.
8
 
 
We will now summarize the data on health care consumption, on individual (non-
health) characteristics and on individual health. A short description of the variables and 
summary statistics for the estimation sample are given in Table 1. For categorical 
variables, we indicated the reference category with an asterisk. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The HIS contains information on utilization of the general practitioner (GP), the 
specialist, emergency department, dentist, prescribed and non-prescribed drugs, and 
hospital care.
9
 Visits to day centres are not included in the definition of hospital care, 
but are taken up as a separate question. The information on hospitalizations allows us to 
define at the individual level the number of hospital spells (with a maximum of three) 
during the last year and the number of nights during each hospitalization. 
 
Table 1 also summarizes the available demographic and socio-economic information. 
We equivalized income using the modified OECD scale that weighs the first individual 
with 1, subsequent individuals with 0.5 and children (defined as 13 or younger) with 
                                                 
8
 There is no good information to cross-validate this percentage in Belgium. Statistical analysis of the 
differences between the total sample and the estimation sample gives no reasons to question the 
assumption of exogenous sample selection. 
9
 Note that in Table 1 there is additional item-non-response for some items of health care consumption. 
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0.3, and then categorized it into a set of six income ranges in order to allow for a 
flexible functional form. Some individuals qualify for lower co-payments – such 
preferential treatment is provided by the compulsory health insurance system to patients 
with a weaker socio-economic background. The HIS does not inform on job 
characteristics. This is unfortunate since Berghman and Meerbergen (2005) have shown 
that these characteristics are important for the take-up of employer-provided insurance 
policies. The latter are more often taken out by/provided to employees with a long-term 
contract, working in large firms and working in specific sectors. 
 
One of the main strengths of the Belgian HIS is the large battery of questions on health 
status. We do not use the information related to acute conditions, since these most 
probably do not influence the decision to take up supplemental insurance. First, we use 
self-assessed health
10
 and a dummy indicating whether the individual suffers from a 
chronic illness or is handicapped. In addition, the HIS contains detailed information on 
the type of chronic disease suffered by the respondent. We experimented with different 
possibilities to make use of that information and at the end decided to include the 38 
diseases as separate dummies.
11
 The detailed information on specific conditions gives 
interesting insights into the pattern of health care consumption and the correlation 
                                                 
10
 Since the number of respondents in “very poor health” is less than 0.5% of our sample, we pooled this 
group with the respondents in “poor health”. 
11
 We did not have enough information to classify the diseases in different severity classes. Simply using 
the number of diseases induces a huge loss of information, even if it is introduced in a non-linear way (or 
through a set of dummies representing ranges of the number of diseases). 
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matrix shows that there is no problem of multicollinearity.
12
 Second, we calculated the 
body mass index based on the available information on height and weight. We construct 
four regions of the body mass index (see e.g. Garrow, 1992): an index between 18 and 
25 indicates regular weight, while (>=25) <18 indicates (over-) underweight, and >=30 
indicates obesity. Third, the survey includes the ten questions of the SF-36 physical 
functioning score – in which higher values correspond to better physical functioning.13 
Experimentation with different empirical specifications suggested that it was 
informative to divide the 0-100 range in three sub-ranges (0-33, 33-66, 66-100), for 
which we defined separate dummies. 
 
Who takes up supplemental health insurance? A bivariate probit 
model 
Let us first look at the take-up of supplemental health insurance. In the next section, we 
will analyse in more detail the effect of supplemental insurance on health care use. 
However, to get a better insight into the issue of the endogeneity of insurance status for 
the explanation of health care use, we present in this section the results of a bivariate 
probit model that jointly models the uptake of supplemental insurance and the 
probability of at least one night in the hospital (see e.g. Holly et al., 1998). Table 2 
shows the univariate partial effects, i.e. the change in the absolute probability of having 
supplemental insurance/at least one hospital night if a dummy takes the value 1 
compared to 0. 
                                                 
12
 The highest correlation coefficient between any two health variables is 0.35, and the large majority of 
correlation coefficients is below 0.1. 
13
 The questions on the other SF-36 domains were not included in the HIS. 
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Table 2 about here 
 
The first column gives the results for the take-up equation. The RESET-test for the 
insurance equation has a p-value of 0.28, which rejects the alternative hypothesis of 
misspecification (Peters, 2000), and we found no indications of heteroskedasticity using 
a univariate probit model with multiplicative variance function. To test the robustness of 
our findings, we also estimated the model with all kinds of interaction effects included 
and we experimented with different sets of health variables. These sensitivity analyses 
did not lead to significantly different results.
14
 
 
Let us now turn to the interpretation of the results. First, we find that among the 
demographic variables, only age, being single without children and being a non-EU 
member are relevant determinants of supplemental insurance. Compared to the 
reference age category of 40–44, persons aged between 50 and 70 are more likely to 
have supplemental insurance. This finding seems to be demand-driven, whereas the 
decline in insurance coverage for the 70+ (compared to those between 50 and 70) might 
result from exclusion restrictions in insurance policies or from higher prices offered to 
the elderly. Unsurprisingly, singles are less likely to have supplemental insurance and 
the same holds for non-EU citizens. 
                                                 
14
 We also investigated the predictive power of the insurance equation by analysing the percentage of 
correct predictions in the sample and by implementing an out-of-sample forecasting exercise along the 
lines of Jimenez-Martin et al. (2002). The latter was based on 100 random subdivisions of the sample in a 
training (80%) and a forecast sample (20%). The model performs well and we found no evidence of over-
fitting. 
  
 
13 
 
Second, there are strong socio-economic differences. Individuals with a university and 
higher education degree are more likely, and individuals with no or primary education 
are less likely to have supplemental insurance. The results suggest that the relationship 
is non-monotonic, i.e. individuals with a university degree are less likely to have 
supplemental insurance than individuals with a higher (non-university) education 
degree. For equivalent income, a similar pattern is found, i.e. insurance take-up is 
associated with higher income, but again the pattern is non-monotonic. This non-
monotonicity at the top is hard to explain, but should not detract from the main 
conclusion that there is a clear socio-economic gradient in the take-up of supplemental 
insurance. This is confirmed by the findings for the occupational groups. Employees are 
more likely than any other occupational category to have supplemental insurance.
15
 
Among the other categories, we observe in decreasing order the retired, the self-
employed, the sick, the others not working and the unemployed. The finding for the 
self-employed is reasonable since – compared to some employees – they have to finance 
their insurance policies privately. The lower degree of risk pooling due to the absence of 
collective contracts probably implies higher insurance premiums. Finally, whether an 
individual is eligible for reduced co-payments has a negative effect on take-up. 
 
Third, the results with respect to health and lifestyle variables are mixed. Compared to 
individuals in good self-assessed health, individuals in very good health are less likely 
                                                 
15
 Given the relative importance of employer-financed supplemental insurance, this finding was to be 
expected. However, there is in Belgium no reliable information available about the number of insured 
employees or about the percentage of policies that is paid for by employers. 
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to buy supplemental health insurance, which may point to some adverse selection. 
However, individuals in fair and (very) poor health are also less likely to take out 
insurance. Moreover, and more importantly, except for two specific indicators of 
chronic diseases, none of the other health indicators is significant at the 5% level. This 
does not necessarily imply that there is no adverse selection at all. First, despite the 
richness of the observable health information available, there may be some 
unobservable heterogeneity in health status left.
16
 Second, the (a priori positive) effect 
of the lower health status may be offset by the (negative) effect of the pricing and 
selection behaviour of the insurers (see e.g. Shmueli, 2001). Third, other unobservable 
factors such as risk awareness may also play a role in the take-up decision. We think, 
however, that the lifestyle variables included (e.g. the positive effect of practicing sport 
and the negative effect of smoking) partly capture inter-individual differences in health 
and risk awareness. 
 
Summarizing our results, we find only weak evidence of adverse selection and much 
stronger evidence for socio-economic inequalities in take-up. This is well in line with 
what could be predicted based on our description of the Belgian institutional setting, 
characterized by the very broad coverage of the compulsory system and by the (relative) 
luxury character of the items covered by supplemental insurance. One does not need 
supplemental insurance to be treated well when ill or to avoid waiting lists. However, 
for patients who can afford it, taking supplemental insurance may lead to a more 
comfortable stay in the hospital at a lower cost. 
                                                 
16
 Note, however, that the health information in the model is much richer than the information that is 
available to the insurers when deciding about policies and premiums.  
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We estimated the bivariate probit model to test for the endogeneity of the availability of 
supplemental insurance. The estimate for the correlation coefficient ρ in Table 2 shows 
that we find no evidence of such endogeneity. To get a better insight into this issue, we 
reestimated the model while imposing different exclusion restrictions in the equation for 
the probability of at least one night in the hospital.
17
 The results for the included 
coefficients in the latter equation remain virtually the same with different sets of 
exclusion restrictions – and are almost identical to the results obtained with a single 
univariate probit. The sole specification for which we do reject the hypothesis of 
exogeneity is the one in which we include all regressors in the insurance equation and 
only hospital insurance in the equation on the probability to be hospitalized – and in that 
case the insurance effect is negative. As soon as we include one health variable (e.g. 
self-assessed health) in the probability to be hospitalized, any sign of endogeneity 
disappears. 
 
We do not comment in detail on the results in Table 2 for the probability of spending 
one night in the hospital, as we will present the results for a more detailed model of 
health care use in the following section. 
 
Supplemental insurance and health care use 
In the first subsection, we analyse inpatient care consumption with a rich model that 
distinguishes between the number of spells and the number of nights per spell. In the 
                                                 
17
 As shown by Wilde (2000), we do not need these exclusion restrictions to identify our simple recursive 
model. 
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second subsection, we analyse the results for the categories of outpatient care that are 
available in our data. Correcting for endogeneity is not trivial in the count models that 
we use and all the results in this section are derived under the assumption that the 
dummy on supplemental health insurance at the family level can be seen as an 
exogenous independent variable. The results in the simpler model of the previous 
section suggest (in our view convincingly) that this exogeneity assumption does not 
invalidate our results. Apart from these statistical results, an additional argument for this 
claim is that, compared to other econometric work in this area, we use very rich 
information on the health status (and the lifestyle) of our respondents. 
 
Inpatient care 
The HIS informs on the number of spells and the number of nights per spell during the 
last year. To the best of our knowledge (Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995; Deb and Trivedi, 
1997 & 2002; Gerdtham, 1997; Gurmu, 1997; Deb and Holmes, 2000; Schellhorn et al., 
2000; Gerdtham and Trivedi, 2001; Jiménez-Martín et al., 2002; Riphahn et al., 2003; 
van Doorslaer et al., 2004; Van Ourti, 2004; Winkelmann, 2004; Bago d’Uva, 2005 & 
2006), the literature on the determinants of the number of contacts with the medical 
sector has until now only focused on modelling the total number of contacts/nights 
without distinguishing between the spells. The most popular models are two-part and 
latent class count data models, or combinations of both. The former models assume a 
single spell, whereas the latent class models only distinguish between so-called “high”- 
and “low”-users. A notable exception is Santos Silva and Windmeijer (2001), who 
propose modelling strategies to account for multiple spells if only the total number of 
contacts/nights is known. Since we observe the number of spells and the number of 
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nights per spell directly, however, we can model the individual decision process more 
explicitly. This may be important, since it can be argued that the decision on the number 
of occasions to go to the hospital (i.e. to “start” a spell) is different from the decision on 
the number of nights per spell, in that the patient has much less decision power on the 
latter than on the former. 
 
More specifically, we stick to the popular independence assumption of two-part models, 
but account for spells, i.e. we assume that the data generating process of the number of 
spells is independent from the data generating process of the number of nights per spell. 
We further assume that the data generating process of the number of nights per spell is 
similar for each spell and independent between spells (see further for additional 
argumentation). Both independence assumptions enable us to estimate the number of 
spells and the number of nights per spell separately, rather than jointly, which is easily 
seen from the conditional density: 
(1) 
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where we have for ease of exposition not explicitly accounted for conditioning on 
explanatory variables. isn  denotes the number of nights individual i  spends in the 
hospital during spell s , is  is the number of spells,  1 .  is an indicator function. 
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To analyse the number of spells, we use the negative binomial regression model.
18
 It is 
well known that the conditional mean and variance of the number of spells are then 
given by 
(2)    '; expi i iE s y y   
(3)      ; ; 1 ;i i i i i iV s y E s y E s y        
where yi is a vector of explanatory variables, χ its associated parameter vector, and α is 
the variance of the gamma distributed random component. Equation (3) shows that the 
conditional variance is allowed to be larger than the conditional mean – a commonly 
observed characteristic of health care data – if 0   and  ; 0i iE s y   . If 0  , the 
conditional mean and variance are equal and the model reduces to the Poisson 
regression model. We are not interested in the estimates of the parameters   as such, 
but in the effect of the determinants iy  upon the number of spells is . We derive these 
effects by taking the exponent of the coefficients of the dummy variables as these give 
the proportional change in the number of spells if the dummy goes from zero to one. 
 
The second variable, i.e. the number of hospital nights per spell, can only take strictly 
positive and integer values. We therefore analyse this variable with the truncated at zero 
negative binomial regression model. Analogous to the analysis of the number of spells, 
                                                 
18
 We did not correct for censoring in the number of spells at 3 as this only concerns 44 individuals (less 
than 1% of the sample). Nor did we correct for censoring in the number of hospital nights during the last 
spell (i.e. ongoing hospitalizations during the time of the interview) since this only concerns 24 spells, i.e. 
less than 4% of the total number of spells. 
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we present the estimation results in the form of exponentiated coefficients, which can be 
interpreted as the proportional increase in the untruncated number of nights. 
 
The estimation results are shown in Table 3. The second column gives the results for the 
number of spells; the third column gives the results for the number of nights per spell. 
In both cases, we introduced a dummy indicating whether the individual was living in a 
household with at least one member having supplemental insurance (ins_family). As 
mentioned before, all common supplemental insurance policies in Belgium include 
coverage of household members. Recall that utilization refers to general and psychiatric 
hospitals, but excludes hospital spells for deliveries. The RESET-tests did not point to 
misspecification (Peters, 2000) and the estimates of   show that the (truncated) 
negative binomial model is preferred to the (truncated) Poisson model. Again, we 
experimented with different ways of including the health information and we tested for 
the significance of all kinds of interactions, with special attention for the effect of 
gender. These interaction effects turned out to be unimportant.
19
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Let us now look at the results for the number of spells in the second column. First, the 
effect of the socio-economic and demographic variables is rather weak. Education, 
income and nationality do not matter for the number of spells. The retired have more 
                                                 
19
 Possible explanations for the insignificance of the gender interactions are (a) that all pregnancy related 
aspects are excluded from our data; and (b) that the cell sizes for the very old, for which one might expect 
larger differences between the sexes, are rather small. 
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spells (which might explain the slightly surprising pattern for the age effects) and 
occasional smokers have less spells.
20
 Second, the health variables are very significant 
in explaining the number of hospital spells. Having a chronic illness, or a poor level of 
self-assessed health, increases the number of spells and the same is true for ‘worse 
physical functioning’ as measured by SF-36. The results for the specific chronic 
diseases stand to reason and show that the strongest (positive) effects on the number of 
spells are found for individuals with kidney problems, cancer, stroke, bile problems or 
wrist fractures. Third (and most importantly), the number of hospital spells is not related 
to whether the individual or one of his/her family members has supplemental health 
insurance for hospitalization. 
 
Let us now turn to the estimation results for the number of nights per spell in the third 
column of Table 3. We included in the model dummies for the second and third spell 
(the first spell is the reference category). These dummies are jointly insignificant, which 
gives some justification (i) for our assumption of independence between the data 
generation process of the number of spells and the number of nights per spell, and (ii) 
for assuming that the data generating process of the number of nights per spell is similar 
for each spell. Health indicators are the most important determinants of the number of 
nights. Although the general overall health indicators (self-assessed health and BMI) are 
explaining little, the more refined health indicators (like SF36) and the indicators of 
specific chronic diseases are crucially important and show an interesting pattern with 
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 It is not easy to interpret this latter effect. It may point to some socio-economic inequality in the use of 
hospital care or it could be seen as an indication that we did not control sufficiently for unobservable 
heterogeneity in patient health. 
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relatively longer stays for patients with liver problems, depression, stroke and other 
arthritis. The age effects are rather imprecisely estimated. While the income effect is not 
really smooth, it suggests shorter spells for patients with incomes above 80 000 BEF a 
month (about €2 000). 
 
Our most striking result is the strongly negative effect of having a supplemental 
insurance on the number of nights per spell. This negative effect might be due to 
unobserved heterogeneity in health, leading to types of admissions with a shorter 
expected length of stay for individuals that have a supplementary insurance. Yet, the 
effect of insurance status hardly changes (and does not increase in absolute value) if we 
omit all the health information from the estimated model. An alternative hypothesis is 
that patients with a supplementary insurance (generally richer and better informed about 
the health care system), express a desire for a shorter length of stay. In that case, a 
shorter stay in single rooms may be good for the reputation of the hospital among the 
groups concerned.
21
 Since we have no direct information about possible differences in 
the quality of treatment, it would be dangerous to derive from this any conclusions 
about a higher intensity of care in one-person rooms. We return to the issue of quality in 
the conclusion. However, whatever the interpretation of the negative effect, our most 
important finding is that there is not even the slightest indication of moral hazard in the 
form of an increase in the number of days spent in the hospital. Remember that this is 
not surprising in the Belgian context, in which the supplemental insurance only covers 
luxury services and the outpatient treatment after having left the hospital. 
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 Note in this respect that many hospitals have a shortage of one-person rooms, and therefore no financial 
incentives to keep their patients for a longer period. 
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We focused in this section on the model in which the number of spells and the number 
of nights per spell are modelled separately. This model allows for the richest 
interpretation. In the appendix, we briefly compare its predictive power to that of a two-
part model and a one-equation negative binomial regression model. 
 
Outpatient care 
Let us now have a look at the effect of supplemental insurance on outpatient care 
consumption. This allows us to test explicitly whether the specific predictions derived 
within the Belgian institutional setting hold in our data. We estimated negative binomial 
regression models for the number of visits to the emergency department and the dentist, 
and for the number of spells in a day centre. For visits to the GP and for the number of 
prescribed drugs, we estimated a two-part model consisting of a probit model and a 
truncated at zero negative binomial regression model (Negbin0), which fitted the data 
considerably better. For specialist care and non-prescribed medicines, the negative 
binomial model was outperformed by a two-part model consisting of a probit and a 
truncated at zero Poisson model (Poisson0). The estimated models included all 
explanatory variables that were taken up in Table 3, but for reasons of space, we show 
in Table 4 only the results for the supplementary insurance status. As for inpatient care, 
we assume that this insurance status can be treated as exogenous.
22
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 We checked the relevancy of this assumption through the estimation of a set of bivariate probit models, 
each time with a different outpatient health care category as the dependent variable in the use equation. 
As soon as health variables were introduced, the assumption of exogeneity of insurance status could not 
be rejected in any of these models. 
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Table 4 about here 
 
The results in Table 4 can easily be explained with the Belgian institutional background 
in mind. There is no effect on visits to a GP or to a specialist. These are covered in the 
compulsory system and there are no waiting lists, while supplemental insurance only 
exceptionally covers co-payments. There is no effect on the consumption of non-
prescribed pharmaceuticals either, which indeed are not covered by most hospital 
insurance policies. Supplemental insurance has a positive effect on dentistry – 
remember that orthodontic treatment is only incompletely covered in the compulsory 
system. There is also a positive effect on the use of prescribed drugs (for which the co-
payments usually are covered by hospital insurance, if the consumption is linked to a 
stay in the hospital). The lower (non significant) tendency to go to an emergency 
department and the higher tendency for the use of day centres are in line with the 
attitude towards the hospital system that also resulted in the shorter spells that were 
found in Table 3. 
 
Conclusion 
When analysing the effects of supplemental health insurance, it is essential to take into 
account the overall institutional background of the health care system. Both the take-up 
of supplemental insurance and the (supplemental) insurance effect on health care 
consumption crucially depend on the specific features of the public (compulsory) 
system. Simplistic international comparisons may therefore be highly misleading. This 
general idea is confirmed by our results for Belgium, a country in which the compulsory 
system has a very broad coverage, where there are no waiting lists in the public system 
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and where supplemental insurance (at least until now) does not buy better health care 
quality. Moreover, supplemental insurance mainly relates to extra-billing, applied to 
patients who opt for a single room in the hospital. 
 
This institutional setting leads to specific predictions that are corroborated in our 
empirical analysis. There are only weak indications of adverse selection in the take-up 
of supplemental insurance, but there is a strong socio-economic gradient. Moreover, a 
count model for hospital care that explicitly accounts for the number of spells shows 
that supplemental insurance has no effect on the number of hospital spells and a 
significantly negative effect on the number of nights per spell. The latter result is in line 
with the finding of socio-economic stratification in supplemental insurance and in the 
ensuing choice of rooms. The results for outpatient care also confirm the theoretical 
predictions: no effect on the number of visits to the general practitioner or the specialist; 
a positive effect on dentistry (including orthodontics, which are not covered in the 
compulsory system); and a tendency to go for a qualitatively better “use” of the hospital 
sector (more visits to day centres). 
 
What can be said then about the link between equality of access and supplemental 
insurance? While the strong socio-economic gradient in take-up suggests that there 
might be a problem, supplemental insurance has hardly any significantly positive 
consumption effects. As an example, in Belgium the social gradient in supplemental 
insurance can most probably not explain the pro-rich inequity in the use of specialist 
care. This finding is directly linked to the broad coverage of the compulsory system. At 
the same time our results suggest that a decline in the degree of that coverage with a 
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parallel increase in the coverage of the supplemental system, would lead to a sharper 
socio-economic inequality of access to health care if the present social gradient in the 
take-up of supplemental insurance remains. Moreover, our results concerning the length 
of hospital stays raise subtle questions about socio-economic differences in the quality 
of treatment. At this stage, we have no indications that the quality of medical treatment 
depends on the type of room and hence de facto on the socio-economic group (van de 
Glind et al., 2007). However, what is the relative importance of medical and non-
medical factors in defining quality? Is length-of-stay a quality indicator? Moreover, how 
to define what should be included in the compulsory coverage and what can be left to 
private decisions? While our results are not at all conclusive in this regard, the Belgian 
experience suggests that such more subtle questions should also be considered when 
analysing the growing importance of supplemental insurance. 
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APPENDIX 
 
We have focused on the interpretation of the use of inpatient care applying a model in 
which the number of spells and the number of nights per spell are modelled separately. 
This model is closer to the real world decision processes than its most obvious 
alternatives (a two-part model consisting of a probit and a truncated negative binomial 
model; and a one-equation negative binomial regression model) and therefore allows for 
a more relevant interpretation. One could wonder, however, about the statistical fit of 
these different models. 
 
As far as we know, there is no easy statistical test available to compare these models 
based on the log likelihood. The main reason is that the two-part model and the one-
equation negative binomial model (where the person is the observation unit) have a 
lower number of observations than the spell model (where the number of nights per 
spell is the observational level). We therefore have focused directly on the predicted 
number of nights per person.
23
 Since this can be calculated with each model for all 
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 We also performed two additional checks. First, the RESET-test indicates major misspecification for 
the one-equation negative binomial model (p-value is 1.03E-15). The performance along these lines is 
better for the two part model, but there is evidence of some slight misspecification (p-values of 0.005 and 
0.002 for respectively part 1 and 2 of the two part model). The RESET-test of the second part of the spell 
model has a p-value of 0.201, but the first part of the spell model did not converge with the square and 
cube of the predicted linear index included. Second, we also checked the separate effect of each variable 
on the predicted number of nights per person, and the effect of both parts in the two part model and the 
spell model. All confirmed the underperformance of the one-equation negative binomial model and the 
more intuitive interpretation of the spell model. Both findings make a lot of sense as the number of nights 
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individuals, we are able to compare the empirical distribution functions resulting from 
the actual number of nights (hospnight), and those resulting from the one equation 
negative binomial (negbin) model, the two-part model and the spell model. The 
descriptive statistics in Table A1 show that (i) the one-equation negbin model performs 
poorly and seriously overpredicts the average number of nights; (ii) the two other 
models have a comparable performance; but with (iii) a slightly better fit for the spell 
model. The fact that the spell model only marginally improves upon the two-part model 
(based upon the comparison of the predicted with the actual number of nights) is not 
really surprising since there is only a relatively low number of individuals with more 
than one spell (i.e. 438 individuals have one spell, 66 have two spells and 25 have three 
spells) and since the sequence of the number of spells seems unimportant in explaining 
the number of nights per spell (remember the insignificant results for spell2 and spell3 
in Table 2). In addition, comparing the predicted number of nights per person only 
considers the performance of the spell model in terms of predicting the number of nights 
in an entire year, whereas the spell model allows analyzing the effect of variables within 
a spell (which is not possible with a two-part model). All in all, the slightly better 
predictive performance of the spell model and the fact that it gives a more realistic 
description of the decision process underlying hospital nights are important arguments 
for using it. 
 
Table A1 about here 
 
                                                                                                                                               
per spell should have a less skewed distribution than the positive number of nights (and is thus ‘easier’ to 
model), since the latter has by definition a higher density at large numbers of nights. 
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Table 1: summary statistics of variables in HIS 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Variable Description Obs Mean Stdev Min Max 
Supplemental hospital insurance           
ins_individual individual has supplemental hospital insurance 5349 0,624 0,484 0 1 
ins_family at least 1 household member has hospital insurance 5349 0,690 0,463 0 1 
Health care consumption  – general and psychiatric hospitals, excluding deliveries        
hospspell number of spells at hospital (1 year) 5349 0,127 0,409 0 3 
nightspell number of hospital nights per hospital spell 645 8,852 17,011 1 200 
hospnight number of hospital nights 5349 1,122 7,026 0 200 
Health care consumption – outpatient care           
gp number of times visited GP (2 months) 5243 0,899 1,451 0 20 
spec 
 
 
number of times visited specialist (2 months) 
(excluding contacts during hospitalization and day 
care and at an emergency department) 
5171 
 
 
0,426 
 
 
1,169 
 
 
0 
 
 
24 
 
 
emdep 
 
 
number of times visited emergency department (2 
months) (excluding contacts that resulted in 
hospitalization) 
5139 
 
 
0,032 
 
 
0,198 
 
 
0 
 
 
5 
 
 
dent number of times visited dentist (2 months) 5079 0,269 0,887 0 20 
daycentre number of visits to a day centre (1 year) 5079 0,042 0,243 0 3 
med_p number of prescribed drugs (past 2 weeks) 5349 1,306 1,799 0 27 
med_np number of non-prescribed drugs 5349 0,457 0,868 0 19 
Panel B: Independent variables (dummies) 
Variable Description Mean 
Demographic variables   
male male 0,496 
age 15-24 15 <= age <= 24 0,055 
age 25-29 25 <= age <= 29 0,085 
age 30-34 30 <= age <= 34 0,104 
age 35-39 35 <= age <= 39 0,116 
age 40-44 40 <= age <= 44 [*] 0,106 
age 45-49 45 <= age <= 49 0,102 
age 50-54 50 <= age <= 54 0,095 
age 55-59 55 <= age <= 59 0,069 
age 60-64 60 <= age <= 64 0,067 
age 65-69 65 <= age <= 69 0,067 
age 70-74 70 <= age <= 74 0,053 
age 75-79 75 <= age <= 79 0,045 
age: 80-84 80 <= age <= 84 0,018 
age: 85+ 85 <= age 0,016 
single single without children° 0,170 
single_child single with children° 0,031 
couple couple without children° 0,328 
couple_child couple with children° [*] 0,304 
complex complex household°° 0,168 
Belgian Belgian nationality [*] 0,941 
EUmember non-Belgian EU nationality 0,043 
nonEU non-Belgian non-EU nationality 0,017 
Socioeconomic variables   
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eqinc: 0-20 0 BEF<=equivalent income<20,000 BEF
†
 0,041 
eqinc: 20-40 20,000 BEF<= equivalent income 40,000 BEF [*] 0,385 
eqinc: 40-60 40,000 BEF<= equivalent income <60,000 BEF 0,361 
eqinc: 60-80 60,000 BEF<= equivalent income <80,000 BEF 0,160 
eqinc: 80-100 80,000 BEF<= equivalent income <100,000 BEF 0,035 
eqinc: 100+ 100,000 BEF<= equivalent income 0,018 
no_primary no or primary school 0,185 
secondary secondary school [*] 0,529 
higher higher education 0,202 
university university education 0,071 
otherdipl other diploma 0,013 
employee employee [*] 0,503 
self-employed self-employed 0,069 
retired (early) pensioned 0,248 
sick disabled or invalid 0,026 
unemployed unemployed 0,063 
other not working housework, student, not working 0,092 
preftreat reduction of co-payments 0,119 
sport practising sport 0,674 
smoke_dai daily smoker 0,252 
smoke_occ occasional smoker 0,046 
smokerno non-smoker [*] 0,702 
alcohol drinking alcohol 0,821 
Health variables     
sahverygood SAH very good 0,233 
sahgood SAH good [*] 0,525 
sahfair SAH fair 0,203 
sahpoor SAH poor or very poor 0,039 
chronic chronic illness or handicap 0,289 
asthma having asthma during last 12 months 0,045 
bronchitis idem for chronic bronchitis/CNSLD
††
 0,056 
allergy idem for allergy 0,132 
sinusitis idem for sinusitis 0,085 
heart idem for serious heart condition/myocardial infarction 0,041 
hypertension idem for hypertension 0,144 
abdomen idem for serious abdominal disorders (lasting at least 3 months) 0,032 
liver idem for hepatitis/cirrhosis of the liver/other liver disorder 0,009 
kidneystones idem for kidney stones 0,010 
kidney idem for serious kidney disorder (excluding stones) 0,005 
bladder idem for chronic bladder infection 0,018 
diabetes idem for diabetes 0,033 
thyroid gland idem for thyroid gland disorder 0,042 
glaucoma idem for glaucoma 0,023 
cataract idem for cataract 0,017 
parkinson idem for Parkinson's disease 0,003 
depression idem for depression (lasting at least 2 weeks) 0,063 
epilepsy idem for epilepsy 0,004 
dizziness idem for experiencing "dizziness with falling" 0,033 
migraine idem for migraine 0,109 
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skin disease idem for serious/chronic skin disease 0,031 
cancer idem for cancer 0,018 
tired idem for long-lasting tiredness (lasting at least 3 months) 0,050 
back idem for persistent back complaints (lasting more than 3 
months)/lumbago/sciatica/slipped disc 0,125 
arthrosis idem for arthrosis of knees, hips or hands 0,148 
arthritis idem for chronic rheumatism/rheumatoid arthritis of hands or feet 0,077 
otherarthritis idem for other chronic rheumatism (lasting more than 3 months) 0,040 
stroke idem for brain haemorrhage or its consequences 0,005 
ulcer idem for gastric/small intestine ulcer 0,036 
bile idem for bilestones/infection of the gallbladder 0,007 
osteoporosis idem for osteoporosis 0,039 
wrist fracture idem for wrist fracture 0,006 
hip fracture idem for hip fracture 0,003 
spine fracture idem for fracture of spinal column 0,002 
prostate idem for complaints of prostate 0,021 
uterus idem for prolapse of the uterus 0,007 
other1 1 if another disease is mentioned, 0 otherwise 0,067 
other2 1 if a second other disease is mentioned, 0 otherwise 0,013 
bmi_018 body mass index<18 (underweight) 0,018 
bmi_1825 18<=body mass index<25 [*] 0,521 
bmi_2530 25<=body mass index<30 (overweight) 0,338 
bmi_30+ 30<=body mass index (obesity) 0,123 
SF33 0<=SF-36 score<33 0,059 
SF66 33<=SF-36 score<66 0,089 
SF100 66<=SF-36 score<100 [*] 0,852 
Note: sampling weights of the HIS were used. 
[*] indicates the reference category. 
°: children are household members who are 18 years and younger. 
°°: a complex household is a household which cannot be attributed to one of the other groups (e.g. three 
adults or more). 
†: 
 1€ = 40.3399 BEF. 
††
: CNSLD = Chronic non specific lung disease. 
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Table 2: determinants of supplemental insurance and inpatient hospital admission 
in Belgium in 2001 (bivariate probit) 
  full model 
  dependent is ins_individual dependent is hospnight>0 
male 0,002 -0,007 
age 15-24 -0,101+ 0,091* 
age 25-29 -0,097* 0,027 
age 30-34 -0,044 0,017 
age 35-39 -0,027 -0,013 
age 45-49 0,001 0,020 
age 50-54 0,112** 0,023 
age 55-59 0,096* 0,003 
age 60-64 0,211** -0,031 
age 65-69 0,115* -0,029 
age 70-74 0,009 -0,046** 
age 75-79 -0,007 -0,027 
age: 80-84 -0,015 -0,046* 
age: 85+ -0,170 -0,040 
single -0,092** -0,020 
single_child 0,009 -0,035* 
couple -0,029 -0,034** 
complex -0,051 -0,035** 
EUmember -0,013 -0,024 
nonEU -0,219** -0,006 
eqinc: 0-20 -0,185** -0,001 
eqinc: 40-60 0,059* -0,002 
eqinc: 60-80 0,087** -0,003 
eqinc: 80-100 0,159** -0,008 
eqinc: 100+ 0,039 -0,061** 
no_primary -0,107** 0,004 
higher 0,104** -0,009 
university 0,071* -0,023 
otherdipl 0,105+ 0,077 
self-employed -0,071+ -0,013 
retired -0,071 0,029 
sick -0,126+ -0,011 
unemployed -0,219** -0,024 
other not working -0,161** -0,009 
preftreat -0,087* -0,016 
sport 0,062** 0,005 
smoke_dai -0,056* -0,023* 
smoke_occ -0,095* -0,048** 
alcohol 0,055* 0,008 
sahverygood -0,068** -0,017 
sahfair -0,062* 0,034* 
sahpoor -0,135* 0,056+ 
bmi_018 0,071 0,070+ 
bmi_2530 0,035+ -0,001 
bmi_30+ -0,033 0,021 
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chronic 0,004 0,035** 
SF33 0,011 0,086** 
SF66 0,040 0,045* 
asthma -0,017 0,012 
bronchitis -0,022 0,058* 
allergy -0,022 -0,011 
sinusitis 0,002 -0,023 
heart -0,036 0,013 
hypertension -0,045 0,016 
abdomen -0,018 0,042 
liver 0,087 0,119+ 
kidneystones -0,017 0,094 
kidney 0,177* 0,197* 
bladder 0,071 -0,016 
diabetes 0,076+ -0,013 
thyroid gland 0,045 0,007 
glaucoma -0,050 -0,004 
cataract 0,012 0,023 
parkinson -0,095 -0,032 
depression 0,048 0,050* 
epilepsy 0,047 0,069 
dizziness 0,042 -0,004 
migraine -0,020 -0,020+ 
skin disease -0,061 0,055+ 
cancer 0,030 0,113* 
tired 0,073+ -0,006 
back 0,032 -0,003 
arthrosis -0,050 0,023 
arthritis 0,024 -0,011 
otherarthritis 0,017 0,010 
stroke -0,096 0,170 
ulcer -0,001 0,014 
bile 0,052 0,207* 
osteoporosis 0,109* 0,028 
wrist fracture -0,176 0,183 
hip fracture -0,062 0,107 
spine fracture -0,208 0,050 
prostate -0,089 0,059 
uterus 0,067 0,001 
other1 0,003 -0,009 
other2 0,122+ 0,003 
ins_family   -0,017 
ρ 0,061 
Observations 5349 
Log likelihood -4535 
Note: we report univariate partial effects, i.e. the change in the absolute probability of having supplemental insurance/at least one 
hospital night when a dummy takes 1 compared to 0 while using the average value for all other independent variables. 38 regional 
(district) control dummies are not reported. Sampling weights of the HIS were used. Statistical inference is based on robust 
covariance matrices that allow for clustering at the household level: +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; 
shaded area: jointly not significant at 10%. 
  
 
37 
Table 3: determinants of hospital spells and nights per spell in Belgium in 2001 
  dependent is hospspell dependent is nightspell 
male 0,963 0,975 
age 15-24 2,087* 0,567 
age 25-29 1,283 0,391* 
age 30-34 1,029 0,612 
age 35-39 0,742 0,771 
age 45-49 1,168 0,425* 
age 50-54 1,065 0,957 
age 55-59 0,729 0,377* 
age 60-64 0,492* 0,990 
age 65-69 0,593 0,926 
age 70-74 0,400** 1,334 
age 75-79 0,500+ 1,250 
age: 80-84 0,446+ 1,029 
age: 85+ 0,386+ 0,395 
single 0,715+ 1,242 
single_child 0,621 1,069 
couple 0,660* 0,902 
complex 0,576** 0,982 
EUmember 0,715 0,719 
nonEU 0,854 0,741 
eqinc: 0-20 0,999 0,727 
eqinc: 40-60 1,074 0,658** 
eqinc: 60-80 0,953 1,134 
eqinc: 80-100 0,985 0,389+ 
eqinc: 100+ 0,208* 0,229** 
no_primary 1,022 1,122 
higher 0,830 0,982 
university 0,716 1,369 
otherdipl 1,891 0,218** 
self-employed 0,801 0,712 
retired 1,569* 1,327 
sick 1,070 1,287 
unemployed 0,728 2,059+ 
other not working 0,899 1,327 
preftreat 0,866 0,927 
sport 1,068 1,211 
smoke_dai 0,776+ 1,139 
smoke_occ 0,401** 0,921 
alcohol 1,017 0,838 
sahverygood 0,744 0,974 
sahfair 1,458** 1,038 
sahpoor 1,693* 0,916 
bmi_018 1,543 1,090 
bmi_2530 1,039 1,127 
bmi_30+ 1,175 1,270 
chronic 1,517** 1,069 
SF33 1,769** 2,335** 
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SF66 1,540* 1,443+ 
asthma 1,228 0,496** 
bronchitis 1,508* 1,288 
allergy 0,751+ 0,798 
sinusitis 0,817 0,863 
heart 1,339 0,842 
hypertension 1,267 0,655* 
abdomen 1,199 1,142 
liver 1,810+ 2,873** 
kidneystones 1,924+ 0,882 
kidney 3,032** 1,786 
bladder 1,084 1,109 
diabetes 0,761 1,041 
thyroid gland 1,072 0,715 
glaucoma 1,042 0,826 
cataract 1,187 1,024 
parkinson 0,521 1,571 
depression 1,482* 2,706** 
epilepsy 1,374 0,421+ 
dizziness 0,887 0,720 
migraine 0,747+ 0,859 
skin disease 1,459+ 0,562+ 
cancer 2,174** 1,124 
tired 0,951 0,948 
back 0,881 0,794 
arthrosis 1,252 0,727+ 
arthritis 0,761 1,043 
otherarthritis 1,195 1,853* 
stroke 2,559* 4,835** 
ulcer 1,292 0,853 
bile 2,454* 0,939 
osteoporosis 1,352 0,672+ 
wrist fracture 4,191** 0,115** 
hip fracture 1,951 1,191 
spine fracture 2,439 0,740 
prostate 1,399 0,857 
uterus 1,268 0,248* 
other1 0,879 0,599+ 
other2 0,865 1,076 
ins_family 0,960 0,672* 
spell2  1,160 
spell3   0,925 
alpha 0,456** 0,787** 
Observations 5349 645 
Log likel -1832 -1689 
Note: exponents of coefficients (measuring the proportional change in the number of spells/nights per spell if the dummy goes from 
zero to one) are reported. 38 regional (district) control dummies are not reported. Sampling weights of the HIS were used. Statistical 
inference is based on robust covariance matrices that allow for clustering at the household level: +: significant at 10%; *: significant 
at 5%; **: significant at 1%; shaded area: jointly not significant at 10%. 
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Table 4: effect of supplementary insurance on outpatient health services in 
Belgium in 2001 
health care category  effect of ins_family 
gp Probit 0,037 
 Negbin0 1,037 
  
spec Probit 0,013 
 Poisson0 1,055 
  
emdep 0,783 
  
dent 1,278* 
  
day centre 1,512* 
  
med_p Probit 0,026 
 Negbin0 1,099* 
   
med_np Probit -0,009 
 Poisson0 1,002 
Note: These effects are obtained in a model where all the variables are included that are also in Table 3. We report partial effects of 
supplementary insurance (the absolute change in the probability when the dummy takes 1 compared to 0 while using the average 
value for all other independent variables) for the probit models and exponents of coefficients (measuring the proportional change in 
the number of visits/contacts/number of drugs if the dummy goes from zero to one) for the other models. Negbin0 refers to a 
truncated at zero negative binomial regression model and Poisson0 refers to a truncated at zero Poisson model. Sampling weights of 
the HIS were used. Statistical inference is based on robust covariance matrices that allow for clustering at the household level: +: 
significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; shaded area: not significant at 10%. 
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Table A1: negative binomial model versus two-part model versus spell model of 
hospital nights in Belgium in 2001  
  hospnight Negbin two-part model spell model 
average 1,122 4,167 1,275 1,231 
max 200 5085,410 237,316 218,458 
min 0 0,003 0,002 0,005 
stdev 7,026 64,267 5,429 5,117 
coef of var 6,261 15,423 4,259 4,158 
skewness 13,661 47,699 17,522 15,190 
kurtosis 269,922 2831,417 502,676 345,379 
percentile 1 0 0,014 0,019 0,026 
percentile 5 0 0,037 0,057 0,066 
percentile 10 0 0,056 0,084 0,100 
percentile 25 0 0,116 0,163 0,178 
percentile 50 0 0,261 0,315 0,330 
percentile 75 0 0,736 0,781 0,741 
percentile 90 1 2,630 2,031 1,855 
percentile 95 5 7,356 4,340 4,162 
percentile 99 26 55,956 17,871 18,002 
Note: Sampling weight of HIS were used. 
